Some Phases of Conditions and Warranties in the Law of Sales of Goods by Keysor, W. W.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 2 Issue 2 
January 1917 
Some Phases of Conditions and Warranties in the Law of Sales of 
Goods 
W. W. Keysor 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
W. W. Keysor, Some Phases of Conditions and Warranties in the Law of Sales of Goods, 2 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 
053 (1917). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol2/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. II Published by the Undergraduates of the No.2
Washington University Law School
SOME PHASES OF CONDITIONS AND WAR-
RANTIES IN THE LAW OF SALES
OF GOODS.
CONDITIONS.
In the early days of the common law, sales of chattels were abso-
lute. The only purpose of a sale was to transfer the ownership of a
chattel from one person to another. This was effected by delivery of
the possession of an existing, specified chattel.' Sales of goods were
for cash or by barter. The buyer always had the privilege of inspec-
tion, and the rule of caveat emptor was rigorously applied. It doubt-
less often occurred that the seller of an article had no title to convey;
that the buyer's inspection failed to disclose the defective quality of
the thing sold; or that the thing was unfit for the use intended. In
such cases a transfer of the ownership of the chattel did not effectuate
the intent of the parties or secure to the buyer a fulfillment of his real
purpose. So, the courts, in the interest of trade and fair dealing, early
began to recognize exceptions to the rule of caveat emptor, and to
raise obligations by implication, especially on the part of the seller,
which they called implied warranties. Again, it is obvious that fre-
quently a transfer of a chattel would be desired only in the event of
the happening of a certain thing, or on condition that it might be
returned, if not satisfactory to the buyer. For example: A desires
to purchase B's horse, but A desires also that the horse be first prop-
12 Pollock and Maitland's Hist. of Eng. Law, 179.
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erly shod, and that the horse may be returned to B within thirty days,
if A be not elected a member of the Royal Hunting Club; and, further-
more, A being mistrustful of his own judgment wants B to promise
specially that the horse is sound and suitable for use in hunting. The
primary obligation of A's proposed contract of purchase is the trans-
fer of the general property in the horse, but he wishes to condition
the obligation and to protect himself by a collateral agreement. Stipu-
lations in a contract of a sale of goods which modify, suspend or
rescind the principal obligation are either conditions or warranties.
There is a marked difference between a condition and a warranty
both as to their nature and their effect upon the primary obligation of
a contract of sale; and yet it is often difficult to determine whether
a clause in a contract of sale is one or the other. This difficulty is
ascribable to the confusion* caused by some courts calling various
stipulations conditions, other courts calling them warranties; while
still other courts seem to use the words condition and warranty as
synonyms. Thus, that an article shall conform to the description
under which it was sold is held to be, in this country, by a decisive
preponderance of authority, a warranty;2 in England, and some of
our states, a condition.3 In the case of a sale of five hundred tons of
pig iron to be shipped from Glasgow, the court said that the stipula-
tion, "to be shipped from Glasgow" was a warranty or a condition prec-
edent ;4 but in another case the court recognizes that conditions and
warranties are not the same in the statement that a certain provision
is not "a mere warranty but a condition precedent."' And it has been
decided that certain stipulations in a contract of sale were both con-
ditions and warranties; that is, the buyer could regard them as con-
ditions and refuse the goods, or he could waive them as conditions by
2Gould vs. Stein, 149 Mass. 570, 22 N. E. 47; Whittaker vs. McCormick, 6
Mo. App. 114; Hawkens vs. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198; Cordage Co. vs. Rice,
'5 N. D. 432, 67 N. W. 298; Fogel vs. Brubaker, 122 Pa. 7; Sales Act, Sec. 14.3 Nichols vs. Godts, 10 Ex. 191; 23 L. J., Ex. 314; Shand vs. Bowes, 2 App.
Cas. 455; Chanter vs. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399; Sales of Goods Act, Sec. 13;
Fogg's Adm'r vs. Rodgers, 84 Ky. 588; Columbian Iron Works vs. Douglas,
84 Md. 44; Patrick vs. Lumber Co., 81 Neb. 267, 115 N. W. 780; Springfield
Shingle Co. vs. Edgecomb Mill Co., 52 Wash. 620, 101 Pac. 233, 35 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 258; and Wolcott vs. Mount, 36 N. J. L. 262, in which the court said:
"It will comport with sound legal principles to treat such engagements as con-
ditions in order to afford the purchaser a more enlarged remedy by rescission,
than he would have on a simple warranty."4 Filley vs. Pope, 115 U. S. 213. See also Norrington vs. Wright, 115
U. S. 188, where the same expression occurs.
5 Pope vs. Allis, 115 U. S. 363.
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accepting the goods and treat the stipulations as warranties.6 Some
of this confusion has been eliminated by arbitrary legislative pro-
nouncement as to what stipulations shall be conditions and what shall
be warranties; 7 and the remainder of the confusion would soon dis-
appear if the fundamental distinction between a condition and a war-
ranty were observed by the courts generally. Indeed, the greatest
uniformity, simplicity and certainty in the law of this topic would be
attained by the adoption of the view that all collateral promises in
contracts of sales should be distinguished from true, or contingent,
conditions, and be treated alike as to interpretation, effects and
remedies. In our American Sales Act, and Prof. Williston's profound
and scholarly exposition of it, a promise in relation to goods sold is
never treated as a condition.3
The term condition was very likely imported into the law of sales
of goods from the law of conveyancing,9 and it is to the decisions
relating to wills, deeds and leases, that one may turn for able discus-
sions of conditions and expositions of the legal principles underlying
them. Conditions in sales of goods are identical in form and essence
with conditions in sales of land and other forms of contract, and
there is no reason why they should not be construed by the same rules
of interpretation and be given the same legal effect.
A condition is something which is to happen or be performed by
one party to a contract of sale as a prerequisite to a right to perform-
ance by the other; or as a prerequisite to the right of retention of
the fruits of a performance by the other. It is a substantive part of
the contract of sale, and not a representation or an independent agree-
ment.10 Conditions are often spoken of as collateral provisions or
stipulations; but this is not quite accurate, for neither the main obli-
gation nor the condition can survive their disassociation. A condition
is a vital part of the sale, and a buyer or seller is as much bound by
it as by any other part of his bargain."1
Conditions are, as to form, express or implied; as to their nature,
contingent or promissory; as to time of occurrence or performance,
precedent and subsequent. They have also been classified with respect
6 Accumulator Co. vs. Dubuque St. Ry. Co., 64 Fed. 70; 12 C. C. A. 37.
? See the English Sale of Goods Act, Sec. 11.
$ Williston on Sales, Sec. 180, n. 6.
9 Chalmer's Sale of Goods Act, (5th ed.) 174.
10 Davison vs. Von Lingon, 113 U. S. 40.
11 Smith vs. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173.
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to remedies for their non-fulfillment, as follows: First, those which are
available as defenses, but not as causes of action; second, those avail-
able to the party in whose favor they were made, as defenses, or as
causes of action; third, those which are never available as defenses to
the primary obligation, but are causes of action for damages only.12
A contingent condition in a contract of sale is a casual event,
or something which will or will not happen independently of the
power or will of the buyer or seller. A has a cow with calf, and
B obligates himself to take the calf when dropped and pay fifty
dollars therefor, if it be a heifer calf. This sale is contingent on
the sex of the calf, a thing beyond the control of the parties. The
condition suspends the obligation of each party to the contract until
the condition is fulfilled; and if it be not fulfilled, the contract becomes
a nullity, and neither party can maintain an action against the other.
A more classical illustration of a contingent condition is the case of
the sale of thirty-two tons of hemp on arrival per ship Fannie. In this
sale there were two such conditions, namely, the arrival of the ship,
and the hemp on board. 13 When the price of goods is to be fixed by
a third person, action by him in that regard is a contingent condition,
and if he refuse to fix the price, there will be no sale.1" So, in the
case of a sale of two hundred tons of potatoes to be raised on a cer-
tain sufficient piece of ground, but which quantity was short eighty
tons because of a potato blight, it was held that the growth of the
potatoes was a condition of the seller's liability for non-delivery.16
A promissory condition is a promise which, until performed, sus-
pends, modifies or rescinds the contract of sale. A offers to B for
sale a fire proof office safe, which B agrees to buy, if A will paint
B's name on the safe in gold letters free of charge, to which A as-
sents. In such a contract of sale there are two obligations, one, called
the main obligation, which binds A to transfer the general property
in the safe to B, and binds B to acc:!pt and pay for the safe; and
another, called the collateral obligation, which binds A to paint B's
name as above stated. These two obligations are indissolubly con-
nected, and A's failure to perform his collateral promise will excuse
B's rejection of the safe, if delivered, and will also enable him to
sue A for damages for a breach of his obligation td furnish the safe
2 Burdick on Sales, (2nd ed.) 87.13 Boyd vs. Sifikin, 2 Camp. 326.
14 Fuller vs. Bean, 34 N. H. 290; Davis vs. Davis, 49 Mo., 282.
IsHowell vs. Coupland, L. R. 92 B, 462; Dexter vs. Norton, 47 N. Y. 62.
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contracted for, namely, the safe with B's name painted thereon in
gold letters. Contingent conditions may not be waived by one party
without the consent of the other; but promissory conditions may be
waived by him in whose favor they were made, and he may then call
for the performance of the main obligation. The chief distinction,
however, between contingent and promissory conditions is that the
latter, if unperformed, are not only a defense to him entitled to per-
formance, but are also a basic part of his cause of action for damages.
A promissory condition should be carefully distinguished from
a warranty. Every collateral engagement which is an integral and
essential part of the contract of sale, and is not in itself a cause of
action, is a promissory condition; while every engagement collateral
to the main obligation which is not so indissolubly united with it but
that it may, if unperformed, constitute a cause of action in itself, is
a warranty. The difference between promissory conditions and war-
ranties will be more obvious on a consideration of warranties in the
second part of this paper.1s
Again, the main obligation should not be mistaken for a promis-
sory condition. It is often said that there is an implied warranty
or condition that the buyer shall receive the precise thing purchased.
If there be a sale of a specific, designated article, and some other
article be delivered, the substitution is a breach, not of a condition
or warranty, but of the primary contract.17 The writer submits that
the same is true in sales by description. If one buy by description
and an article of a different description is supplied, the main obliga-
tion is broken. "If a man offers to buy peas of another and he send
him beans, he does not perform his contract, but that is not a war-
ranty; there is no warranty that he should sell him peas, the contract
is to sell peas, and if he sell him anything else in their stead, it is
non-performance of it." 13 Promissory conditions are declared by
Professor Williston to be promises only and not true conditions, and,
if not performed, should be treated like other broken promises.19 There
is no reason apparent to the writer why a promise and performance
of it may not be a condition as well as a casual or natural event, and
16 See Williams vs. Robb, 104 Mich. 242, 62 N. 'W. 352, as to the difference
between a condition and a warranty.
17 Columbian Iron Works vs. Douglas, 84 Md. 44.
s This famous illustration now widely quoted was given by Lord Abinger
in Chantry vs. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399, with respect to warranties. It is
equally pertinent to promissory conditions.
19 Williston on Sales, Sec. 179.
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be attended by the same consequences. If the courts would unite
in granting the same remedies for broken warranties and unfulfilled
promissory conditions, the law in the application and practice of it
would be greatly simplified; but even in such an event, it would still
be necessary to determine whether collateral engagements would, if
broken, justify rescission of the primary contract, or be only causes
of action for damages.
A condition precedent is something that is to happen, or a prom-
ise that is to be performed by the plaintiff before the accruing of the
defendant's liability under his contract.20 It calls for the performance
of same act or the happening of some event after the terms of the
contract have been agreed upon, before the contract shall take effect. 1
Such a condition fixes the beginning of a right, and performance or
happening of the condition secures the subject matter of it. Ordi-
narily conditions precedent are precedent to the passing of the prop-
erty in the goods bargained for; but they may be precedent to the
buyer's right to possession after title has passed, or to the seller's
right to the purchase price. Sales on approval, or to the buyer's
satisfaction,2 2 and delivery by the seller at a designated place,"s are
common illustrations of such conditions. One who is to perform a
condition precedent can not maintain an action against the other party
without pleading and proving performance on his part.24
A condition subsequent relates to a future event or performance,
upon the non-happening of which the obligation ceases to be binding
on that party who may avail himself of the benefit of the condition,
if he choose to do so.25 A condition subsequent, if performed, ter-
minates a right in one party and makes it absolute in the other."6
A condition subsequent is quite invariably subsequent to a transfer
of the property in the goods sold, and on the happening or not hap-
pening of the condition as the case may be, the property revests in
202 Chitty on Contracts, (11th ed.) 1083.
218 Cyc. 558.
2 O'Donnell vs. Wing, 121 Ga. 717; Mowbray vs. Cady, 40 Ia. 604; Osborne
& Co. vs. Francis, 38 W. Va. 312.
2 Savage Manf. Co. vs. Armstrong, 19 Me. 147.24 Governeur vs. Tillotson, 3 Edw. (chanc.) 348; Wiley vs. Athol, 150
Mass. 426, 23 N. E. 311, 6 L. R. A. 342.
ZWords and Phrases, 1402.26 Redman vs. Insurance Co., 49 Wis. 431; 4 N. W. 591.
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the seller, the risk in the meantime being in the buyer.27 A common
example of a condition subsequent is found in a sale or return.28
A condition may present a double aspect, being both precedent
and subsequent. Thus in a sale of goods with reservation of title in
the seller as security for the payment of the purchase price, and pos-
session in the buyer, payment according to the terms of the contract
is a condition precedent to the vesting of title in the buyer, and subse-
quent as to the buyer's right of possession.
Whether a condition be precedent or subsequent is determined
by the intent of the parties making it. The best evidence of intent
is the terms of the contract which relate to the character of the con-
dition; but intent of the parties may also be gathered from the circum-
stances and purpose of the transaction, and from the application of
common sense to each particular case.1s In the absence of direct
evidence the law supplies presumptions of intent. Thus, if any part
of a defendant's promise is to be performed on a day that must or
may occur before the time fixed for plaintiff's performance, then per-
formance by defendant is a condition precedent to performance by
plaintiff, and plaintiff may recover without proving performance or
tender of performance s0 on his part. For example,. plaintiff agreed
to convey to defendant a certain tract of land when paid for, pay-
ment to be made in four years, with interest payable semi-annually.
In an action for the first installment of interest it was held that
plaintiff could recover without a tender of a deed." If in such a
case, however, it should appear that defendant relied on conveyance
rather than on the promise to convey, then payment of the interest
sued for and conveyance would have been mutual conditions, and
neither party could maintain an action against the other without
having tendered performance.3 2
27 Strauss Saddlery Co. vs. Kingman & Co., 42 Mo. App. 208; Sturm vs.
Boker, 150 U. S. 312.
"Gay vs. Dare, 103 Cal. 454; Scroggin vs. Wood, 87 Ia. 497; Foley vs.
Falrath, 98 Ala. 176; State vs. Bets, 207 Mo. 589; House vs. Beak, 141 Ill. 290;
30 N. E. 1065.
" Griggs vs. Moors, 168 Mass. 354; Leonard vs. Dyer, 26 Conn. 172.
30 The word tender as here used does not mean the same kind of offer
as when it is used with reference to the payment or offer to pay an ordinary
debt due to a creditor. "It only means a readiness and willingness, accom-
panied with an ability on the part of one of the parties, to do the acts which
the agreement requires him to perform, provided the other will concurrently
do the things which he is required by it to do, and a notice by the former to
the latter of such readiness." Smith vs. Lewis, 26 Conn. 110.
31 Wilks vs. Smith, 10 M. & W. 355.
,s Larimore vs. Taylor, 88 Mo. 661.
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It is also a presumption of law that a promise which goes only
to a part of the consideration for the defendant's promise will not
be regarded as a condition precedent, if plaintiff's breach of such
promise can be remedied by payment of damages. Plaintiff agreed to
sell and ship to defendant ten car loads of barley, the sale being by
sample, for seventy cents per bushel, on board of cars at shipping
point. On receiving the first car load, defendant found that the
barley was not equal to the sample, and refused to pay for it. There-
upon plaintiff declared the contract at an end and refused to ship
the remaining nine car loads. In an action for the price of the first
car load, the court decided that the contract was divisible and that
defendant's promise to pay for the car load did not go to the whole
consideration of the contract, and that non-payment of the first car
load did not justify plaintiff's refusal to deliver the remainder of
the barley.33
Where the reliance of a promise is based on a remedy for dam-
ages for non-performance of a condition rather than on performance
itself, performance will not be regarded as a condition precedent. A
sold five hundred bales of cotton to B, he agreeing to pay one hun-
dred dollars as part payment for each fifty bales procured by A, and
to pay interest on delayed payments. In an action for non-delivery
A defended on the ground that B failed to make payments. It was
decided that payment by B was not a condition precedent to his
right to the cotton, for A had agreed to accept interest as a remedy
for B's failure to make payments when due.3 4 When, however, time
of performance of a condition is of the essence of a contract-and
it is so in the contracts of merchants 31-the condition will be held
to be precedent, even though the contract is severable, and payment
of damages would suffice.36
3 Meyer vs. Wheeler, 65 Ia. 390; Hansen vs. Heating Company, 73 Ia.
77, 34 N. W. 495; Holt vs. United Security Life Ins. Co., 76 N. J. L. 585;
72 At. 301, 21 L. RL A. (N. S.) 691; Newton vs. Winchester, 16 Gray, 208;
Bettini vs. Gye, 45 L. J. Q. B. 209; DeKay vs. Bliss, 120 N. Y. 91; Ritchie vs.
Atkinson, 10 East. 295.
3 Benj. on Sales, Sec. 562.
35Pope vs. Porter, 102 N. Y. 366; Norrington vs. Wright, 115 U. S. 188.
At law the time fixed for the performance of a condition is deemed to be of
the essence of the contract. Shinn vs. Roberts, 20 N. J. L. 435. Time is
usually of the essence of an executory contract for the sale and delivery of
goods, where no right of property in the same passes on the bargain from
the vendor to the purchaser. Jones vs. United States, 96 U. S. 24; 24 L.
Ed. 644.
36 Roberts vs. Brett, 18 C. B. 561; 11 Eng. Reprint, 1363; 84 E. C. L. 533;
Tompkins vs. Elliot, 5 Wend. 496.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol2/iss2/1
IN THE LAW OF SALES OF GOODS.
A condition precedent may change to a warranty. "Although a
man may refuse to perform his promise till the other party has
complied with a condition precedent, yet if he has received and
accepted a substantial part of that which was to be performed in his
favor, the condition precedent changes its character, and becomes a
warranty or an independent agreement, affording no defense to an
action, but giving a right to counterclaim for damages." 37 It is
impossible to determine from the authorities just what will constitute
a substantial performance. The true test ought to be, and very prob-
ably is, the inability of him who has received the benefit to rescind
the contract because he cannot place the other party in statu quo.
That performance of a condition precedent may be waived by
him entitled to it, is unquestioned law; as to what is the effect of such
a waiver, the decisions are hopelessly contradictory. Some courts
hold that when a buyer accepts goods which he might have rejected
because of the seller's non-performance of a condition precedent, he
waives the condition and with it a right to recoup or sue for damages ;3s
for conditions precedent do not survive acceptance of the goods as
do warranties.39 Other courts, however, hold that a waiver of a
condition changes it into a warranty with a consequent right to dam-
ages; in other words, a waiver of a condition in his favor by one
party is not a performance of that condition by the other,40 and dam-
ages may be had for such non-performance. 41 The latter rule is sound-
er on principle, is approved by text writers, and is undoubtedly sup-
3TMorse vs. Moore, 83 Me. 473; Wiley vs. Athol, 150 Mass. 426, 23
N. E. 311, 6 L. R. A. 342; Avery vs. Burrall, 118 Mich. 672, 77 N. W. 272;
Swobe vs. Electric Light Co., 39 Neb. 586; Morse vs. Union Stock Yards, 21
Ore. 289, 28 Pac. 2, 14 L. R. A. 157; Tacoma Coal Co. vs. Bradley, 2 Wash.
600, 27 Pac. 454; Kaufman vs. Roeder, 108 Fed. 171, 47 C. C. A. 278, 54
L. R. A. 247. In Griggs vs. Moore, 168 Mass. 363, the terms of the contract
were such that the court refused to turn a condition precedent into a war-
ranty, even though the plaintiff had performed a substantial part of his part
of the contract.
uAtkins & Co. vs. Cobb, 56 Ga. 86; Theater Co. vs. Sigel, 221 Ill. 145,
77 N. E. 588; Jones Bros. vs. McEwan, 91 Ky. 374, 16 S. W. 81; Lee vs. Bangs,
43 Minn. 23, 44 N. W. 671; McClure vs. Jefferson, 85 Wis. 208, 54 N. W.
777; Schopp vs. Taft & Co., 106 Ia. 612, 76 N. W. 843; Henderson Elevator
Co. vs. Milling Co., 126 Ga. 279, 55 S. E. 50; Hazen vs. Wilhelmie, 68 Neb. 79.
SMaxwell vs. Lee, 34 Minn. 511, 27 N. W. 196.
"Mehurin vs. Stone, 17 0. St. 49.
41 Morse vs. Moore, 83 Me. 473, 22 Atl. 362, 13 L. R. A. 224; Brown vs.
Weldon, 99 Mo. 564; St. Louis Brewing Ass'n vs. McEnroe, 80 Mo. App. 429;
Redlands Orange Growers' Ass'n vs. Gorman, 161 Mo. 203, 54 L. R. A. 718;
Cordage Co. vs. Rice, 5 N. D. 432, 67 N. W. 298.
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ported by a decided weight of authority.42 Where a condition may
be waived without prejudice to an action for damages for its non-
fulfillment, it is immaterial whether the action be based on a broken
warranty or a breach of the original contract of sale.' 3
Conditions have thus far been viewed in their relations to the
primary obligation of the contract of sale, and may be now considered
in their relations to each other under the head of dependent and in-
dependent conditions. A condition which is independent of the pri-
mary obligation is not a true condition, but a warranty; and therefore
the descriptive words independent and dependent are used only in
cases of mutual conditions.
Dependence or independence of conditions, as of covenants, is to
be construed according to the intention of the parties.44 Mutual con-
ditions which are to be performed contemporaneously are dependent
or concurrent;45 if to be performed at different times, they are inde-
pendent. 46 If promissory conditions are mutual and each goes to the
whole consideration, they are dependent;47 but if such a condition
goes t6 a part only of the consideration, and a breach of it may be
redressed by damages, the condition is independent.4 A promissory
condition with a penalty annexed is independent. 4 In cases of mutual
dependent conditions neither party can maintain an action against the
other until he has performed or tendered performance.50 But if con-
siderations and conditions are independent, although mutual, either
party may recover damages for non-performance by the other, even
though he himself has failed to perform on his part."1
W. W. KEYSOR.
42 Mechem on Sales, Sec. 1393; Williston on Sales, Sec. 488, Sales Act,
Sec. 49.
43Wolcott vs. Mount, 36 N. J. L. 262; Bagley vs. Cleveland Rolling Mill
Co., 21 Fed. 159.
4Loud vs. Pomona Land Co., 153 U. S. 564; Griggs vs. Moors, 168 Mass.
354; Kaufman vs. Roeder, 108 Fed. 171, 47 C. C. A. 278, 54 L. R. A. 247;
Freeland vs. Mitchell, 8 Mo. 487.
'5Pavell vs. Ry. Co., 12 Ore. 488, 8 Pac. 544; Phillips Construction Co.
vs. Seymour, 91 U. S. 646. Justice Miller said: "Where a specified thing
is to be done by one party as the consideration of the thing to be done by the
other, it is undeniably the general rule that the covenants are mutual and are
dependent, if they are to be performed at the same time."
46 Mayers vs. Rogers, 5 Ark. 417; Davis vs. Heady, 7 Blackf. 261; Tur-
ner vs. Millier, 59 Mo. 526; Sawyer vs. Christian, 40 Mo. App. 295; Tompklns
vs. Elliott, 5 Wend. 496; Goldsborough vs. Orr, 8 Wheat. 217.
47 Butler vs. Manny, 52 Mo. 497.48Turer vs. Millier, 59 Mo. 526; Smith vs. Crews, 2 Mo. App. 269.
49 Freeland vs. Mitchell, 8 Mo. 488; Gates vs. Ryan, 115 Mass. 596.
50Southwestern Freight and Cotton Press Co. vs. Stanard, 44 Mo. 71.
5111 Cyc. 1054; Benson vs. Hobbs, 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 285; Cook v,.
Johnson, 3 Mo. 239; Huffcut's Anson on Contracts, 368.
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